Sorry to be this blunt, but your comment seems to exemplify exactly the kind of empty, performative critical stance that this piece aims to highlight.
Let me go point by point.
You write:
> “People outside do not look to be neatly put in one of the other three quadrants. They are interested in questioning the division lines you propose.”
But people can’t simply choose to be “in” or “out”—they already occupy a position, whether they like it, want it, or even know it. I’m not “proposing” a taxonomy. This isn’t prescriptive; it’s descriptive. And it's easy to see that it's descriptive because it follows from two straightforward questions:
1. Who paid for this research?
2. Is it speculative or truth-oriented?
That's all. These aren’t abstract philosophical categories—they're empirical markers. There is no space “in between,” not logically, not institutionally, not socially. If someone tries to position themselves in the margins, or “question” these divisions (whatever that may mean), they’re either obscuring economic conflicts of interest (who paid?) or dodging epistemic responsibility (is this truth-oriented or not?). There is no such thing as a “speculative truth” or “true speculation.” Both truth and speculation are valid modes of discourse—but ambiguity between them isn’t. And arguably, the direction of the ambiguity matters: making speculation sound like truth is worse than the reverse, but I haven't made up my mind clearly about this yet.
So no, “questioning the division lines” isn’t some radical gesture—it’s often a reactionary one.
You then write:
> “The formal goal (goal of the form) of independent researchers is to appropriate the scientific discourse, the discourse of the Master.”
Besides the Lacanian flourish, this claim is incoherent. Lacan’s “discourse of the Master” refers to a structure where authority replaces justification—where you obey not because the content is true, but because of who speaks. Scientific discourse, if anything, explicitly aims to resist this. And you admit this in your first line:
> “Scientific research lays reasonable claim to be the place of alethic and prudential research.”
If the claim is reasonable, then scientific authority is (at least partially) justified, not imposed. So no, it's not a Master's discourse. Ironically, what does look like a discourse of the Master is much of what travels under the banner of “independent research”: assertions without peer review, no accountability, no methodological transparency. That’s closer to authority-as-style than to epistemic rigour.
You then say I want everyone to “pick their lanes.” But again—you can’t “pick” your lane. You’re already in one. Not recognizing this is the problem.
As for the actual threats, there are many, ranging from cultural to political. A few examples that come to mind:
1. Accountability in public discourse: In a democratic society, we should be accountable for what we say. I thought this was a shared value. Maybe you disagree.
2. Platforming incompetence: No one would let me publish a pediatric medicine treatise. But cultural criticism, science commentary, or speculative theorizing? Open season. The problem isn’t people theorizing freely—it’s the economics and reputation systems that follow, especially once platforms and profit are involved.
3. The erasure of labor: Academia isn’t some abstract Orwellian machine. It’s a material system populated by underpaid workers who produce public knowledge. The recent Italian reform (from a far-right government) cut PhD stipends, reduced postdoc contracts, and made tenure harder. Know what authoritarian regimes target first? Universities. Look at the U.S., Hungary, Turkey. The systematic delegitimization of public institutions—under the guise of emancipatory critique—makes that easier.
So yes, let’s keep criticizing academia where it fails. But let’s also be aware of the stakes. Shifting trust and money toward private “research” hubs or ambiguous influencers doesn't undermine power—it just changes who wields it, often in more dangerous and less accountable ways.
Hey,
Sorry to be this blunt, but your comment seems to exemplify exactly the kind of empty, performative critical stance that this piece aims to highlight.
Let me go point by point.
You write:
> “People outside do not look to be neatly put in one of the other three quadrants. They are interested in questioning the division lines you propose.”
But people can’t simply choose to be “in” or “out”—they already occupy a position, whether they like it, want it, or even know it. I’m not “proposing” a taxonomy. This isn’t prescriptive; it’s descriptive. And it's easy to see that it's descriptive because it follows from two straightforward questions:
1. Who paid for this research?
2. Is it speculative or truth-oriented?
That's all. These aren’t abstract philosophical categories—they're empirical markers. There is no space “in between,” not logically, not institutionally, not socially. If someone tries to position themselves in the margins, or “question” these divisions (whatever that may mean), they’re either obscuring economic conflicts of interest (who paid?) or dodging epistemic responsibility (is this truth-oriented or not?). There is no such thing as a “speculative truth” or “true speculation.” Both truth and speculation are valid modes of discourse—but ambiguity between them isn’t. And arguably, the direction of the ambiguity matters: making speculation sound like truth is worse than the reverse, but I haven't made up my mind clearly about this yet.
So no, “questioning the division lines” isn’t some radical gesture—it’s often a reactionary one.
You then write:
> “The formal goal (goal of the form) of independent researchers is to appropriate the scientific discourse, the discourse of the Master.”
Besides the Lacanian flourish, this claim is incoherent. Lacan’s “discourse of the Master” refers to a structure where authority replaces justification—where you obey not because the content is true, but because of who speaks. Scientific discourse, if anything, explicitly aims to resist this. And you admit this in your first line:
> “Scientific research lays reasonable claim to be the place of alethic and prudential research.”
If the claim is reasonable, then scientific authority is (at least partially) justified, not imposed. So no, it's not a Master's discourse. Ironically, what does look like a discourse of the Master is much of what travels under the banner of “independent research”: assertions without peer review, no accountability, no methodological transparency. That’s closer to authority-as-style than to epistemic rigour.
You then say I want everyone to “pick their lanes.” But again—you can’t “pick” your lane. You’re already in one. Not recognizing this is the problem.
As for the actual threats, there are many, ranging from cultural to political. A few examples that come to mind:
1. Accountability in public discourse: In a democratic society, we should be accountable for what we say. I thought this was a shared value. Maybe you disagree.
2. Platforming incompetence: No one would let me publish a pediatric medicine treatise. But cultural criticism, science commentary, or speculative theorizing? Open season. The problem isn’t people theorizing freely—it’s the economics and reputation systems that follow, especially once platforms and profit are involved.
3. The erasure of labor: Academia isn’t some abstract Orwellian machine. It’s a material system populated by underpaid workers who produce public knowledge. The recent Italian reform (from a far-right government) cut PhD stipends, reduced postdoc contracts, and made tenure harder. Know what authoritarian regimes target first? Universities. Look at the U.S., Hungary, Turkey. The systematic delegitimization of public institutions—under the guise of emancipatory critique—makes that easier.
So yes, let’s keep criticizing academia where it fails. But let’s also be aware of the stakes. Shifting trust and money toward private “research” hubs or ambiguous influencers doesn't undermine power—it just changes who wields it, often in more dangerous and less accountable ways.